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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IH<:TTY A~KHt·:~. 
[> cl i Uoner and A p }Jclla Ill, 
-vs.-
Till·: l:\I>U8TRIAL CUJ\11llSSION 
OF rTAII. ~PEHHY HA~D COR-
POlL\'rlO:\, and LIBERTY 1\IU-
TPAL 1:\~lTlL\~CJ•: COl\IPANY, 
Defcndauts and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'N BRIEF 
Case No. 9969 
~TATE.Jl~:\T OF THE KIXD OF CA~l£ 
Tlus i~ a <:asp which arise::; fron1 the denial of \Vork-
men's l'ompl·nsation IH:'!ll' fib to appellant by the \Vork-
nwn\ Compensation insurer of appellant's mnployer for 
injuri('8 resulting fr.om a fall during appellant's lunch 
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2 
hour in a cafeteria operated by a lessee within the build-
ing of appellant's e1nployer where appellant wa~ em-
ployed, and frmn the denial by the Industrial Comlllis-
sion of appellant's application to have a determination 
1nade that the injuries occurred in the course of or arose 
out of appellant's employment. 
DISPOSITIOX IK INDUSrrRIAL 
COMnliSSION OF THE STATE OF"' UTAH 
r_rhe application of appellant to the Industrial Com-
mission of the State of Utah for a determination that 
the appellant was entitled to the benefits ·of the vVork-
Inen's Compensation Act on the ground that the injuries 
occurred in the course of or arose out of appellant's 
employment was denied and the Industrial Commission 
found that the injury did not arise out of or in the course 
of appellant's employment. Appellant's Application for 
Re-Hearing, as amended, was denied by the Industrial 
Commission and appellant petitioned for and obtained 
a 'Vrit of Review to this Honorable Court. 
STATE~1EN~"' OF FACTS 
The salient facts with few exceptions were stipulated 
to by the parties at the beginning of the hearing before 
tlw Industrial Counni~~ion ·Of Utah. These facts a:r;-e as 
foJlow:-;: 
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1. "At the tilne of the accident Plaintiff was an 
employee of Sperry l ~tah Engine·ering Labora-
tory, a division of Defendant Sperry Rand Corpo-
ration. Defendant Sperry provided, for the use 
and convenience of its employees, a cafeteria in 
connection with its Clearfield Plant. The cafe-
teria was operated by Defendant Clark's Cafe-
l~:ria, under a contractual arrange1nent with De-
fl'ndant Sperry Rand, the details of which are not 
relevant to the issues here. Food is offered for 
sale at the cafeteria and employees n1ay, if they· 
prefer, bring their lunches from home and Pat 
them in the cafeteria. Employees are not required 
to eat at the cafeteria, and n1ay, if they desire to 
do ~o, eat in other areas in the plant, or in other 
areas on the base, or they 1nay, if they wish, leave 
the base during the lunch hour. However, they 
have only 48 minutes for lunch. 
"On the day of the accident, Plaintiff had pur-
chased her lunch in the cafeteria and after having 
eaten it, and while carrying her tray to the dish-
washing area in accordance with the customary 
practice, in some manner fell, sustaining injuries 
for which she brings this action. Admittedly 
Plaintiff was not paid for her lunch hour period, 
and she could utilize the time as she saw fit." 
Employees on day shift were allowed a 48 
minute lunch hour and it was inconvenient to pur-
chase lunch at facilities other than the cafeteria 
locat0d within the building where appellant was 
employed. Appellant customarily ate at the leased 
eafeteria within said building. There is smne dis-
pute as to what percentage of other employees 
~imilarly situated used thi~ eafeteria and what 
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percentage ate elsewhere, but at lea::;t it must be 
agr~ed that a substantial pPrcentage of employees 
ava1led then1selves of the s.aid eating facilities. 
The cafeteria was located within the four walls 
of the buildi~~ _where appellant wa::; employed, 
and other fac1hbes were some distance awav re-
. . .,., (lUlnng travel to and from them bY autmnobile 
(R-Page 19 and 20). · 
2. The cafeteria facilitie~ in the building where 
~in;. Askren was ernployed were furnished as a 
''fringe benefit" for the e1nployees and was main-
tained prinmrily for the use and benefit of the 
employees by Sperry Rand Corporation. rrhe 
only other users of the cafeteria were o-ccasional 
visitors and vendors. (R-Page 32-Lines 8 to 17). 
ST ATEl\lE~T OF POIX11S 
ARGl~l\IEXT 
POINT I. 
THAT THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN 
FINDING THAT THE INJURY AND RESULTING CLAIM 
OF APPELLANT WAS NOT COVERED BY THE PROVI-
SIONS OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT IN 
THAT THE INJURY DID NOT OCCUR IN THE COURSE 
OF OR ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF APPEL-
LANT AND IN DENYING APPELLANT'S APPLICATION 
FOR RE-HEARING. 
In analyzing the con~iderable number of antlwritie:) 
on tl1i~ point, the Court ~honld bear in mind that the 
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vrovi:-;ioH:' pf the \Yorknten ·~ C01npensation Act, Sections 
::~l-1--~;) nnd :1CJ-1-60, U.C.A., 19G3, provides that injuries 
ure covered under two alternative ·situations, that is, the 
.\l't provides coverag·e~ for injuries. caused by_ ·accidents 
ari~ing out of or in the course of a workman's empJoy-
nll'nt (emphasis added). The "\Vorlunen'~ Compensation 
:-;tatute~ of many state~ re(1uire that for injuries to be 
l\)lllpensable they must arise out of and in the course of 
t'IIIployment. rrhe Utah Court has recognized this dis-
tim·tion as being a real and valid one. In U t.ah Apex 
.1/iu.ing ( 'ompauy v. lndt£strial Commission, 67 Utah 537, 
~~~ P. -190, the Court states: 
The Utah Industrial Act allows compensa-
tion for injuries to employees, within the act, re-
sulting from "accident ar:i:sing out of or in the 
course of their e1nployment." The Utah statute 
is distinguishable frorn the statutes ofother states 
and the English statute in that it allows cJom-
pensation when the accident arises in the course 
of the employrnent whether it arises out of the 
employrnent or not. It must be conceded that in 
most cases where an employee sustains an injury 
which is compensable both conditions will be 
found to exist. But it is conceivable that many 
accidents may occur in the course of employment 
which do not arise out of it. This distinction has 
been reeognized by this Oourt in several cases 
heretofore decided, State Road Con1n1. v. Ind. 
Comm., 56 rtah 252, 190 P. 54-!; Twin Peaks Can-
ning Co. Y. Ind. Comm., 57 Utah 589, 196 P. 853, 
~0 A.L.R. S7:2: Cudahy Packing Co.\. Ind. Comm., 
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60 l~tah 161, ~U7 P. 1±8, 2S A.L.H. 139-± .. An 
award of compensation in each of the cases above 
cited was sustained by this Court on the theon 
that the accident arose in the course of emplo):_ 
ment. In State Road Cornmission Case, supra, it 
was expressly held that the accident did not arise 
out of the emploJinent, but did arisP in the course 
of it. In the other two cases the inference i:;; nl-
most conclusive t~o the saine effect. 
In a treatise recently published by Corpus 
.Juris on • \V or.luuen's Compensation Aets,' the 
author at pages 72, 73, says: 
"The expressions 'arising out of' and 
'in the course of' the employ1nent are not 
synonynwus; but the words 'arising out of' 
are construed to refer to the origin or cause 
of the injury, and the ,,·ords 'in the course of' 
to refer to the time, place, and circumstances 
under which it occurred. An injury which 
occurs in the course of the emplo~'ment will 
ordinarily, but not necessarily, arise out 
of it, while an injtu~- arising out ,of an em-
ploynlent ahnost necessarily oecurs in the 
course of it.'' 
The definition of the terms referred to in the 
excerpt just quoted is about as concise as can be 
found in anY of the authorities we have examined. 
A~ the statutes o.f nearlv all the states require 
the fulfillment of both co~ditions before compen-
sation is allowed, it is not to be expected that the 
eourb in such jurisdictions would often find it 
necessar~· to d~fferentiate hehn•en the two. 
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l'l'rhap~ our own decisions to which we have 
referred furnish as sure a guide as can be found 
as to when, and in what circumstances the distinc-
tion should be applied. 
The court wPn t on and applied the distinctvon by 
,·it ing and eomparing fact situations in light of this dis-
tindion and the court concluded as follows: 
" ... We doubt if there is any better illusrta-
tion of the distinctilon between the two conditions 
named in the statute than is found in the English 
case referred to. The employee was in the course 
of his employmenrt when he undertook to go across 
the tracks tJo the messroom to prepare his break-
fast, but the origin or cause of his injury was not 
connected with his employment .... 
~ll•moranda of Authorities were submitted by inter-
ested parties for consideration by the Industrial Com-
mi:5~ion and it is interesting to note that even "'the Memo-
randum of defendant admits that the numerical weight 
of the authority supports the applicant's position" (R-
Page -t~). Defendant then asserts that, however, the 
better reasoned cases are in favor of the position 
espoused hy defendant. 
A nwnber of Utah cases dealing with the general 
~mbject matter of this appeal were cited in the various 
~femoranda but no ca::;p::; directly in point had been de-
eided by the Supremr Court of the State of r tah. Seldmn 
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i~ an appellant to the Honorable Court fortunate enough 
to receive an advance declaration of this Court's view 
of the law on that appellant'::; specific situation before 
the appellant'~ ta~e is heard. However·, this· appears to 
have happened in the instant 1natter. In the case ur La 
Preal Wil.,on L:. Searc._,., Roel;uck & CoJJlpany, &upreme 
Cottrt .No. 9793, which is :-:;till in the advance sheets and 
the decision in which wa~ rendered unanimous!~· \\'ith the 
Pxteption of the llonorable Justice ~lcDonough who 
had disqualified himself, ·this Court stated the law in 
l~tah relating to applieation of the \Yorkmen's 8ompen-
sation Ad to an emplo~·ep on the employee's lunch hour. 
The case appears to be directly in point and to ade-
<luately settle the law in this arPa. The fads in that 
ea~e were as follows: 
Appellant was a regular employee of re-
spondent. She had taken advantage of her em-
ployee disc1ount privilege b~· purchasing two room-
siz-ed rugs. During her lunch hour period she 
went out to the parking lot and got her automo-
bile and brought it around to customer pickup 
for the purpose of taking delivery of said mer-
ehandise. She \\·as about to back her car down the 
ramp when another en1ployee asked her not t~o do 
this because theY had to back the compan~· truck 
in to load it for 'the next dav'~ deliveriPs. So, :-;he 
dr'ove her car around to th~ end 'Of the ramp and 
parked at one of the walkways, dismounted, and 
was proceedin o· alon o· a \Yallnn1 Y to the back door b 0 • . 
when a pile of tires fell ·On her, causing the m-
juriP~ eomplained of. ..:\11 of tlw above event:-
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uvell!Ted oll respondent's pre1nises. Appellant had 
intended to leave• her e1nployer's property and 
dPlivPr thesp rugs to her borne smne distance 
awav. i\lter .the accident she did, in fact, drive 
ILPr :·ar home, whei'e the rugs ,,~ere unloaded. She 
thPn returned to work. 
';'h,• ( 'ourt said: 
"Did appellant's injuries arise out of or in 
the ('our~e of her employn1ent within the provi-
sions of :1C>-1--tCJ, l~.C.A. 19531 rrhe answer t•o this 
qtwstion must be in the affinnative. An employee 
d<H·~ not necessarily and ipso fac:to lose his status 
a:-; sueh when the noon whis·tle blows. Stwte Hd. 
Com. Y. Industrial Cmu., 56 Utah 252, 190 P. 
;)-t-t. He may eat his lunch at the place where 
he may be in connecti1on with his duties, or a1t the 
dt>~ignatl•ct place (Utah Apex Mining Co. v. In-
dustrial Com., ()/ Utah 537, :2-±8 P. 490) and still 
remain within the scope of the Cmnpensa:tion Act. 
TraYPlt•rs Ins. Co. v. 1\fcAllister, 345 S.vV. 2d 355 
(Tt>x.). Employers :Mutual Ins. Co. v. Industrial 
l 'om., :2;)0 P. 39-1 (Colo.). In the case at bar the 
employee \ra~ accorded the fringe benefit of being 
able to purchase merchandise at a discount and 
to takP delivery of such articles during the noon 
hour. Such benefits are considered to be helpful 
in employer-employee relations, and Inost of the 
decided cases hold that the servant has the pro-
teetion of the compensation acts if injured while 
attempting to ta:ke advantage of such privileges 
during the lunch hour and ·while 1011 the employer's 
premises .. Tim~. cmnpensabon has been upheld 
\\~here the employee sustains an injury while par-
ticipating in athletic events, expressly or implied-
ly encouraged by the employer (Henry v. Lit 
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Bro., 165 A. 2d 406 ( Pa.) ; Geary v. Anaconda 
Copper Min. Co., 188 P. 2d 185 (I\l'ont.) and, 
where it was made to appear that the empl'oye1· 
encouraged his help to use or purchase equipment 
on the premises for personal purposes, industrial 
cJompens·altion has been approved. :Maheux v. 
Oove, etc., 164 A. 2d 574 (N.H.) And see Daniels 
v. Krey Packing Co., 346 S.W. 2d 78 (Mo.). On 
the other hand, where it appears that the em-
ployee was injured while doing an entirely per-
sonal act or something forbidden by her employer, 
a different ru1e would prevail. See Mutti v. 
Boeing Aircraft, 172 P. 2d 249 (Wash.); U.S. 
Steel v. Cicilian, 180 N.E. 2d 381 (Ind.) ; Perri v. 
Scott Testers, etc., 121 A.2d 644 (R.I.) We think 
that the trial court correctly held that the em-
ployee ~n this case was injured while engaged in 
an (J)ctivity encourag·ed or acquiesced in by the 
employer during the lunch period and while on 
the employer's premises (emphasis added) and 
was, there~ore, li1nited to the benefits given under 
theW orkmen's Compensation Act." 
We can see no way in which it can be legitimately 
argued that the l'mployee and appellant in this case 
was not ''injured while engaged in an activity encouraged 
or acquiesced in by the en1ployer during the lunch period 
and \Vhile on e1npl'Oyer's premises" within that rule as 
sta;ted in the \Vilston case. It was certainly well known 
that substanti'al nun1bers of employees utilized the cafe-
teria facilities for the purpose for which they were 
provided, that i~, a eonvenient eating place for employees 
on the rather isolated premises of Sperry Rand at Clrar-
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l'il'ld. 'I'IH· facilitie~ weru ~peeific.ally p1~ovided for this 
purpo~e prhnarily and as a fringe benefit to eutployee~. 
'rhl'Y were only slightly used Ly any persons other than. 
employee::;. At be:st, it was inconvenient for entployees 
to eat elsewhere. 
It Ita~ been argued by dt•fendant in its l\fmn:orandum 
tlmt the eafeteria wa~ not part of the "employer's preut-
i~l·~ ... however, this argmnent cannot be reconciled with 
tht> .authorities. 1,'he cafeteria was within the four walls 
of thl' :-;amt• building where the activities of appellant's 
t>lllplo~·ment wer·e carried on. rrrue, it was operated hy 
a ll'~~l'(', hut tlw term~ uf the lease have never been utade 
part or the record and, in fact, we1~e not deemed to be 
t·elevant by the Industrial Commission in 1naking its 
finding. Certainly, it is customary flor a lessor to retain 
:-;ome right~ over premises leased and, as a 1natter of 
fad, und~r the leas·e in questiun, the lessor asstuned the 
obligations of cleaning up. The cafeteria was certainly 
a~ much a part of the prentises as was the parking lot 
of ~Par~. Roebuck and Company in the Wilson case, or 
a:-; much a part of the pre1nises as many of the places de-
~erilwd in thr authorities hereafter cited w'hich were 
places other than the actual location of the acts covered 
hy tlw employment. In Shields L Am. lJiotori:st Ins. Co. 
~tii F'~d 49, the employer maintained a cafeteria thro1tgh 
(I les~ce for the joint convenience of the con1p:any and 
it~ employ~e:-: and s•o that the einp}oye·es could ren1ain 
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within the yard within the lunch period. rrhe claimant 
during hii:l lunch period was walking down a .path pro, 
vided by the employt>r toward the . cafeteria when he 
slipped and sustained. injuries. For his damages, he 
brought an action against his employer's liability immrer 
under the provisions o.f the Louisiana Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. The Court entered a smnmary judgment 
for the insurer, holding that the Compensation Act 
should be liberally const~·ued in f:avor of coverage. The 
Oourt said: 
"Unquestionably if there were a suit for 
Workmen's Compensation the einpJoyee would be 
successful. That fact, about which no reasonable 
man would disagree, negatives plaintiff's right to 
re0over here . . . Whether injury to a workman 
arises out of and in the course of employment is 
whether the nature of the employment was such 
that the risk from which the injury resulted was 
greater for the workn1an than a person not en-
gaged in the empl1oyment." 
To the same effect i:-; .N:a6o·1ud Surefry Corp. v. Bel-
lah, (Tex.) 245 F2d 936. 
~umerous o'ther authioritie;-; including those cited in 
the decision of this Court in the Wilson v. Sears, Roebuck 
and Company ra~P support the po~iti'on of appellant: 
In 1 Larson \Y1orkmen's C01npensation Law, Sec. 21.-· 
:21, pag·es 29R-99, the rules 1l n' ;-;t,ah-'d a~.; follows: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
"injuries occurring· on the premises during 
u. regular lunch hour arise in the course of eui-
ployment, even though the interval is technically 
oubide tlw regular hours of e1nployment in the 
~l'HSL' that the worker receives no pay for that 
time and is in no degree under the eontr'ol of the 
employer, being· free to go where she please~. 
'''!,here are at least four situations in which 
tlw eour~t> of employutent goes beY'ond an ein-
plu~·pp ·~ fixed hours of work; the tiine spent going 
and coming on tht> premises; an interval before 
working h'ours while waiting to begin or uraking 
preparations, :and a sintilar interval after hours ; 
regular unpaid rP~t periods taken on the premises, 
and unpaid lunch hours on the premises. A de-
finite pattern can be discerned here. In e~ach in-
stance the time, although strictly outside the fixed 
working hours, is closely contiguous to them; 
the activity to which that ti1ne is devoted is re-
lated to the employn1ent, whether it takes the 
form of going or con1ing, preparing f'or work, or 
ministering to pers,onal necessities such as food 
and rP~t; and, above all, the employee is within 
the 8patiallimits of his employment." 
And at page 300, the same author says: 
··In any case, most courts have concluded that 
the unpaid lunch hour on the premises should be 
d€Pmed to fall within the C'ourse of enipl6J1nent." 
And at page 304, he states: 
. "But en.:n if the en1ployee has to pay for the 
tood out of Ius own poeket, the connection with the 
Plllployment remains an1plP. The lunch i8 still 
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wi,thin th~ category of lunch taken on the employ-
er s premises, and the fact that the employer pre-
pares or sells the food only strengthens the <'l;t-
ployment link. Thus, in a North Car'olina caHe, 
a textile m'anufactu:r.er siOld his employees coupon 
books with which they could purchase sandwiches 
and cold drinks from an employee specially en-
gaged to sell these refreslunents. Plaintiff em-
ployee suff.ered severe gastric disturbances from 
spoiled rood s1o acquired, but her negligence action 
was dismissed on the ground of exclusive Com-
pens·ation Act ~overage." 
To the same effect se·e 58 Am. JuL, vVorkmen's Cow. 
pens.at~on, Sec. 228 : 
"While Not Actively Engaged or during In-
termission. - W·orkers in a factory :or other place 
of empJoyment do not necessarily depart from 
the course of their en1ployment by enguging in 
social intercourse, or visiting in othe:r parts of the 
building or premises, while not actually employed 
in the performance of their duties, so as to thereby 
deprive themselves of the right to CJompensation 
f.or injuries received while so engaged. In anum-
ber of cases it has been held that an injured work-
man is entitled to compensation for injuries re-
ceived on the e1npioyer's prmnises, although the 
ac({ident occurred during lunch period when work 
was not actively in p1~ogress, where the eating of 
the lunch on the premises was with the employ-
er's knowledge and consent, express or implied. 
* * * The general ru1e that injuries occurring 
during an intern1ission for rest or refreshment 
arise in the coui"se of the employment is not af-
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fected by the f~act that the etnployee is paid by the 
hour and ree(:'iVP~ no pay fior the period covered 
by such intennission." 
~l'" ah;o the same work at page 242: 
"Such acts are reasonably necessary to the 
health and comfort of :an employee while at work, 
such as the s1atisfaction of his thirst, hunger, or 
other physical demands, or protecting himself 
from exees~ive cold, although personal to himself 
and not strictly acts orf service in his mnployinent, 
are nevertheless incidental to the employment, 
and injuries sustained in the performance of such 
an act are generally held to be compensable as 
arising out of and in the course of the employ-
ment." 
An t'Xet'llent case discussing the entire prob1em and 
ronsidering it at some length, is Thomas v. Proctor & 
Gamble Mfg. Oo. (Kan.) 179 P. 372. In that case the 
l'onrt said : 
''The fact that she was working by the hour, 
and that the accident took place out of working 
hours, do~~ not conclusively establish that it did 
not ()(>cur in the course of her empl1oyment. The 
shortness of the intermission suggests that it was 
tlw expectation that Inost of tlhe employees would 
remain on the premi,ses, and the practice shown 
by the evidence confirms this. The purpose of 
the plaintiff ~and her associates in remaining in 
the factory after their hmch had been eaten was 
preswnably to be on hand when work com1nenced, 
in order that there 1nig-ht be no delay____)a matter in 
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which the e1nployer had an obvious interest. • * * 
In the leading English case on the subject which 
has been frequently ·cited . with. approval 'in this 
country, the scope of the decision was fairly indi-
cated by this language of the headnote: 
" 'A workman was paid by the hour for the 
number of hours per week that he was actually 
·engaged on his work, not including the midday 
dinner hour. During· that hour he was at liberty 
to stay and take his meal on the premises, or to 
go elsewhere. He stayed on the premises, and 
sat down to eat his dinner, and while so doing 
a wall fell upon him, and he was injured. Held, 
that during the dinner hour there had been no 
bre·a$: in the employment of the workman, and 
that he was entitled to claim compensation.' Blo-
vel vs. Sawyer, 1 K.B. 1904, 271. 
"In the opini,on of the Master of the Rolls 
the whole situation was gone over in these words: 
'' '* * * It seems to 1ne that, notwithstanding 
what rs alleged as to the payment being for the 
hours in which the applicant was actually en-
gaged in work, and not for the time in which he 
took his meals, we 1nust take a broader view, and 
treat him as continuing in ·the employment of 
the master by the consent of the master, inas-
much as it is for the master's advantage that the 
workmen should have an opportunity to feed 
themselves. * * * From the mere facts that he 
w.a·s n.ot paid for his particular time, and that he 
was not engaged in the n1ain purpose of his work, 
it cannot, as a matter of law, be said that he had 
ceased to be in the employm·ent of his master.' 
Pages 273, 27 4. 
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"()n(' of tht• Lord .Ju:-;ti<'t':-; ::;aid: 
.. ·t t abo a p pt~a r~ that he \Va~ not obliged to 
leave tlw plaee whPrP l1P was working and obtain 
shelter and food elsewhere. '"rhat being the case, 
how l•an it be said that thi::; accident did not occur 
in tht• ('onrsl:' of his employntent''? 
"Another added : 
" 'In my viPw it <·an make no difference if 
the fad is that by tlw terms of the particular en-
gagenHmt the wodnnan was to have the right, if 
~o minded, to get his dinner on the employer'~ 
premises. I think it would be to place a narrow 
construction on the act if we held that the acci-
dent to thP appellant did not occur in the course 
of hi~ emploYJ.nent.' 
"Of an employee who during the noon inter-
mission, after eating his lunch on the premises, 
fell into thP river and was drowned, it has been 
said: 
"'All tht} circumstances and facts tend to 
~how that up to this time he expected to resume 
hi~ work when lunching time had expired, and 
hence he was within the scope of his service when 
walking at this place.' Milwaukee Western F. Co. 
,.. Industrial Commission, 159 Wis. 636, 642, 
150 X. W. 998,999. 
"Other expres~ions bearing on the matter 
are: 
.. ·TJw relation of ma::;ter and servant, inso-
far as it involves the obligation of master to 
protect tlw ~Prvant, is not suspended during the 
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no_on. hou!·, ':her~ t~e lHa~ter expressly, or uy 
fau 1mphcahon, 1nv1tes h1s servants to remain 
on the premises in the immediate vicinity of the 
work' Bradbury's vVorkmen's Compensation 
(3rd Ed.) 524. 
" 'As directly applied to the noon intermiH-
sion, it is a long and well-settled rule that thP 
service tie, or contractual relations and obliga-
tions between 1naster and servant, is not broken 
by such suspension of all activities directly bene-
ficial to tlw ·employer.' Haller v. City of Lansing, 
195 Mich. 753, 758, 162 N. \V. 335, 337 (1. R. A. 
1917E, 324.) 
"See also, Boyd's \Vorkmen's Compensation, 
§481; 1 Honold on \Vor:kmen's Compensation, 
§111; Etherton v. Johnston Knitting l\Iills Co., 
185 App. Div. 820, 17:2 N.Y. Supp. 72+; Raeine 
Rubber Co. v. Industrial Commission, 165 \Vis. 
600, 162 K. W. 644: Griffith v. Cole Bros. et al. 
(Iowa) 165 X. \V. 577, L.R.A. 1918F, 923; Riley 
v Cudahy Packing Co., 82 Neb. 319, 117 l\. W. 
765; In re Sun dine, :21 S ::\1 ass. 1, 105 N. K 433, 
L. R. A. 1916A 318." 
See also the case of E1nployer's ~~ ut. Ins. Co. v. 
Industrial Com1nission of Colorado, (Colo.) 230 P. 394: 
"The finding~ of the commission, so far as 
now 1naterial, .are as follows: 
" "The elaimant was injured during the noon 
hour. He caine out from the mine where he was 
working and in attending to a call of nature 
. I 
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stopped under an old bank on the top of the m.ain 
slope portal, and wa~ ca~1ght by a cave-in of 
thi~ bank. Hi:-~ at'eid('Ilt occurred on the em-
ploypr's premi~ws and during the clai1nant's work-
ing hours.' 
.. On appeal to the district court, the petition 
:-;ought to :-;pt asidP the award on the ground that 
there is no ·evidence to support tht> finding that 
the accident occurred during the einployee's work-
ing hours. There is no 1uerit in that ground. The 
fact that the accident oecurred during the noon 
hour, when no actual work was being done, dnes 
not preclude the accident frmn being in the cotusP 
of the employn1ent. Haller v. City· of Lansing, 
195 ~fi<'h. 7fl:3, 162 N. W. 335, L. R. A. 1917E, 
:~2-l. ,, 
Another similar case is Texas Employers' lnsura11ce 
.lsso. l'. /)acidso;;z., (Tex.), 29 5S. W. 2d 482. 
~PP also Caporale v. D~partment of Taxation and 
Finance, (N.Y.). 1-+2 N.E. 2d 213. 
'l'o the srune effect, see .. Jmel'ican Motors Corp. v. 
htdn,-;frial Comm. (Wis.), 83 N.\V. :2d 71-l, and Dyer v . 
. '-.>ar ..... Roebuck and Company (Mich)., 85 X.vY. 2d 153. 
ln the case of Twin Peaks Ca11ning Co. c. Industrial 
Comm. of Ctah, 196 P. 853, a 15-year-old en1ployee of a 
eanning factorv "·as killed in an elevator while returnino· 
• b 
tn It;:-; ~tat.ion after having visited "·ith an employPe 
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on a different level during a leisure period. It was hel<.l 
that Lhe accident was compensable. 
And in the recent case of Stroad u. Ind!lsirial j 
Oorn1n. (Ut.), 27:2 P. 2d 187, a police sergeant who wa~ 
off duty was assisting two other officers in transfering 
some beverages to an automobile for transmission to 
a police benefit party. \Vhile so engaged, his servie(· 
revolver fell and discharged, striking and killing him. 
The accident was held to be cmnpensable, the court citing 
with approval the Twin Peaks Canning Compan)' case. 
Col.son vs. Steele, 73 Idaho 348, :25:2 P. 2d 10-±9, in 
which the Idaho Court allowed cmnpensation to surveyor 
who was injured while target practicing with his own 
gun during the lunch hour. This case is cited with 
approval by the l 'tah Supreme Court. 
Stroud vs. Jndu:)trial Commissio11, 2 Ut. 2d. 270, 
272 P. 2d 187. This Utah case has been covered in 
~IWITy's .l\lemorandum. 
Goodyear Aircraft Corp. L:s. J ndustrial C'om m issi.on, 
62 Ariz. 398, 158 P. 2d 511 ( 1945). 
E·mployers iliutual Ius. Co. c .... ·. lndu.strial Commis-
sion, 7() Colo. S-1-, 230 P. 394 (1924). 
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/Jnmphrey v~. Ind1u;lrial Conwtis . ..,·iou, 285 Ill. :37:2, 
l:!U ~.E. 816 (1918). 
Zar/1a vs. Lane, 322 ~lass. 132, 76 ~.E. 2d 318 
1 I ~~~7). 
Shields t:.s Am. Jlotori.st Ins. Co. (CCA5), 267 F. 
~~1 ~H ( 1959). 
Satio11al Snr£ty Corp. us. Bellah (Tex.), 245 F. 2u 
936. 
Te.ras Employers Insurance Assodation vs. David-
sun. ~!)5 S. \V. 2d. 482 (1956), in which the Court found 
that a slip and fall during the lunch period in the work 
nrea wa~ covered by W ork1nen's Compensation. 
Amaican ... lfotors Corp. vs. Industrial Comm·ission, 
":~ ~.\Y. :2d 714, (Wis. 1957), in which the Court held 
that a fall from a 8tack of pack crates after rest during 
the luneh hour was compensable. 
Dyer rs. Sears and Roebuck Company, 85 N.\Y. 2d 
1:1 ~ {~Iichigan 1957), in which the Court held that a fall 
nfter leaving the company lunchroon1, on the stairs, still 
during the lunch hour, was compensable. 
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SUMMARY 
In sumrnary appellant contends that the Wilson ';s. 
Sears, Roebuck and Company case is controlling; that 
the injuries which occurred during appellant's lunch hour, 
'>rithin the building wher·e appellant was employed at the 
leased cafeteria therein, arose out of or in the course of 
appellant's en1ployment and are compensable under the 
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Ap-
pellant, therefore, urges that the Court should reverse 
the decision of the Industrial Commission of Utah and 
find that appellant's injuries are subject to compensa-
tion under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHARLIER 
Carman E. Kipp 
Attorneys for Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
